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My dissertation research in Belize this year is an ethnographic project tracing the trajectory of 
two nutritionally-related diseases in this Central American country, one infectious (parasitic 
infection) and the other non-communicable (diabetes mellitus). To contextualize the 
contemporary data I have collected about how people negotiate available care systems today, I 
visited the Rockefeller Archive Center in October of 2009 to deepen my understanding of the 
historical fields in which these two diseases are embedded with respect to then-British Honduras. 
I was especially interested in learning more about how past Rockefeller philanthropic 
interventions for worm diseases and diabetes mellitus relate to modern international health 
initiatives for these same health issues: What might any parallels reveal about the broader 
political meanings of these programs over time, and what can any shifts in their recurring tropes 
suggest about the novel structures of public-private philanthropy today?  
 
The Rockefeller philanthropic interventions in these diseases involved two distinct Rockefeller 
institutions: the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, with its expertise in medical science, 
and the public health work of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) through its International Health 
Division. The RF's "Hookworm Survey" in British Honduras first began in 1915-1916, largely as 
an extension of its work elsewhere in Latin America. The survey's stated intent was to estimate 
hookworm's importance "as a cause of diminished efficiency among the people,"[1] thus linking, 
from the beginning, the elimination of this parasite explicitly to manpower and the country's 
potential development. Dr. Lewis Hackett, graduate of Harvard Medical School and veteran of 
hookworm campaigns elsewhere in Central America, managed the survey throughout the 
country's six districts. In his official report on southern British Honduras, Hackett reiterated the 
connection between disease and productivity: "I only wish to point out once more that, in my 
opinion, ankylostomiasis [hookworm disease] in this district is so prevalent as to seriously 
threaten the vital energy of a great portion of its inhabitants."[2] 
 
But while Hackett saw hookworm treatment as a possible keystone for bolstering the health and 
productivity of the rural communities in southern British Honduras, the local people themselves 
often had a rather different view of the programs. Hackett noted that the local Creoles referred to 
him as "Buckra," an African word for master -- pointing toward the volatile and deep-seated 
colonial histories of racial tension in which the RF program unfolded...[3] "In southern districts, 
where most of the people are Caribs, it was found almost impossible to get them either to come 
up for examination or to construct privies," exclaimed one report about southern Belize's 
Garifuna people,[4] a mixed West African and Amerindian ethnic group who were known for 
their fierce independence. In the initial British Honduras Hookworm Survey report, the 
program's uneven reception was couched in subtler, more positive terms: the people were 
"willing to take the treatment, and ready to avail themselves of simple sanitary measures for 
eradicating the disease, provided such measures were made obligatory to all."[5]  
 
Persistent issues of community resistance to hookworm treatment in parts of British Honduras 
eventually lead to the proclamation of Ordinance No. 18 of 1918, known as the "Hookworm 
Ordinance." It read in part: 
Any person who, without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails to bring and leave a sample of his 
feces at the appointed time and place, shall, on summary conviction, be liable to a fine not 
exceeding twenty-five dollars, and, in addition, if the Court so orders, to be detained in custody 
by such person and in such place as the Court orders until a sample of his feces is obtained.[6] 
Locals could also be detained in custody "for the period of seven days during which treatment 
for hookworm disease may be administered by a health officer, reasonable force being used if 
necessary."[7] In this ordinance, hookworm testing and pharmaceutical deworming treatment 
were not simply presented as available services, but as such urgent needs that citizens who 
refused them were viewed as a grave risk -- perhaps not only to the security of British 
Honduras's first nationwide health intervention, but also to one of the first early gestures of state 
authority in which colonial governance reached into the country's more remote corners. 
 
In places such as Mexico and Brazil, policymakers often viewed the RF hookworm (and later, 
yellow fever) interventions as a possible way of solidifying the infrastructures of growing 
nations. But in the case of British Honduras, many early reports suggested that the fractured 
fluidity of this anomalous country -- increasingly visible through these early health reports -- in 
fact made it "unsuitable" for more extended efforts to combat hookworm. As Hackett wrote of 
his survey trip in a letter to Dr. Wickliffe Rose: 
In the interior we encounter mainly Indians and mestizos -- and ignorant, affable and dirty folk. 
They are so unintelligent that the use of chemopodium, administered in the dispensary, is 
indicated...an intensive campaign would be impossible. The men are scattered through the forest 
during ten months of the year ‘bleeding chicle' and wander into Guatemala and the Yucatan.[8] 
Later in his official report, Hackett again linked Belize's fluid "national boundaries" to "the 
impossibility of waging an intensive campaign."[9] Or, as Wilbur A. Sawyer wrote of British 
Honduras in 1936, almost twenty years later, "He [the Medical Adviser to the British Colonial 
Office], as well as I, realizes that the country is backward and very poor and that this may limit 
the possibilities of cooperation."[10] Benjamin E. Washburn reported of the landscape of health 
in Belize in the following year that there was still no medical school or laboratory, and that of the 
three doctors working in the "ramshakly" hospital, one was a Jamaican and another a Cyprian 
Turk, while the only doctor he met in Stann Creek was a 40-year-old Hindu retired from the 
Malay Medical Service.[11] The doctors, like their patients, came and went from various foreign 
countries -- making the possibilities over time largely unfeasible for the continuity of both the 
caregivers necessary to sustain IHB health programs over the years, and the interventions ' 
intended recipients. Yet these pragmatic issues in British Honduras also gave way to a rupture in 
one of the program's dominant metaphors: hookworm represented a risk of breached boundaries 
causing ill health, perhaps of both bodies and nations. In the war against hookworm, the 
population at risk had to first be circumscribed -- and if it could not be bounded coherently, it 
could not be treated either. 
 
These survey notes and brief colonial exchanges regarding the medical system in British 
Honduras are also glimpses into the deeply intertwined themes of early health interventions and 
statecraft. In a sense, efforts to extend these projects failed simultaneously in British Honduras's 
early history. Hookworm, from the beginning, has been viewed as a disease of groups and 
nations, a security risk and source of poverty, an explanation for why certain countries could not 
prosper. But the difficulty in getting local people to adhere to these same hookworm 
interventions also gives us a glimpse into the actual functioning of British Honduras's 
commonwealth government during this period, with limited practical reach into the remote and 
ethnically diverse corners of Belize. The short-lived hookworm survey in British Honduras thus 
reflects a kind of paradoxical narrative -- the public health rhetoric held that eliminating 
hookworm would bring about rapid development, but a certain level of developmental 
infrastructure and national coherence was also initially required before an extended hookworm 
campaign would even be put into place. With the medical administration in colonial British 
Honduras often as piecemeal and nomadic as the inhabitants of these poor tropical villages, the 
Rockefeller hookworm activities in British Honduras were commensurately short-lived, 
withdrawing only a few years after the initial survey. 
 
In contrast to the Rockefeller Foundation's hookworm interventions in British Honduras and 
throughout Latin America, the insulin therapy programs for diabetic patients, organized around 
the same time under the auspices of the Rockefeller Institute, were limited strictly to the United 
States and Canada. However, certain details in the British Honduras files still foreshadow the 
coming epidemic of diabetes that today has become the leading cause of death in Belize. 
"Vegetables are not as plentiful as they should be," wrote one RF observer in a 1937 description 
of the Belize City marketplace.[12] Despite sugar cane being a leading agricultural industry, the 
initial Hookworm Survey of British Honduras listed "refined sugar" as a prime import even 
then.[13] These records importantly highlight that, unlike many surrounding countries, where 
agricultural histories were once tied to traditional grains and healthy crops that local people had 
grown for centuries, British Honduras's early eclecticism also represents a history that has been 
tied to a dependence on imported, refined, and largely unhealthy foods from its very beginnings.  
 
Interestingly, the same Frederick Gates who was instrumental in the creation of the RF's 
international hookworm efforts was himself a diabetic, and played a major role in persuading 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to support insulin therapies in their earliest stages. As he wrote of his 
own experiences with insulin in a 1923 letter to Rockefeller: "Already the results of the treatment 
are simply magical” For 14 years I have been afflicted with this distressing over secretion of 
sugar."[14] In another letter that same year, he wrote to Rockefeller in strong support of insulin 
therapy's philanthropic promise: "This is the greatest philanthropic plum of the generation 
waiting to fall into your hands, and I want you to have the benefit of it."[15]  
 
Rockefeller soon agreed, and his gift of $150,000 initiated a groundbreaking program in which 
select hospitals in the U.S. and Canada offered insulin supplies to needy patients who otherwise 
could not afford the new drug. Administered by the Rockefeller Institute, the funds were 
disbursed by a committee of Rockefeller philanthropic advisors that consisted of Gates, Simon 
Flexner and Arthur Woods. The funds were to be used to treat diabetic patients as well as to 
teach physicians how to use insulin to treat diabetes. The excitement of this program is palpable 
in the newspaper clippings from that year. The Globe called it a "Complete Cure" for diabetes. 
"New Serum Dooms an Age-Old Curse," read a headline in theEvening Telegram.[16]  
 
But insulin, of course, does not cure diabetes. It only controls the disease, with doses measured 
carefully against glucose intake day after day. This did not stop the international excitement 
stirred by the enthusiastic headlines announcing Rockefeller's support of insulin therapy. People 
wrote from around the world desperately describing their diabetic symptoms and that of their 
dying loved ones; some letters were followed by announcements about the death of the patient 
for whom help had been requested. The folders that contain these requests are filled with letters 
from Salvador and Costa Rica, Zaragota and Barcelona in Spain, British India, Norway, France, 
Mexico and Hungary.[17] But, as one woman's request for help outside the U.S. was answered in 
1924: "[The Rockefeller's insulin provision] activities, however, have not gone beyond this 
country."[18] 
 
There is something interesting about looking at these diabetes files side by side with reports from 
the RF's international campaigns. In the case of the ankylostomiasis program in British 
Honduras, the hookworm pharmaceuticals were at times being forced on citizens who actively 
resisted them even at risk of imprisonment. Meanwhile with diabetes, desperate pleas for insulin 
therapies were arriving from around the world, without institutional recognition of any medical 
need outside the United States. This stark contrast underscores the fact that while hookworm was 
considered an international issue and security risk, diabetes from the beginning was inscribed as 
a domestic disease requiring only national intervention and patient responsibility. 
 
But one fascinating file suggested that diabetes could be a pressing international issue -- if it 
were contagious. A very interesting series of RF correspondence took shape around an 
"outbreak" of diabetes inspidus in India in 1952, as RF staff investigated the possibility that the 
disease may be caused by a virus. A retrospective look at the files today makes one wonder if 
this outbreak of diabetes inspidus in fact more closely resembles diabetes mellitus. This sudden 
surge of diabetes cases in India was linked to a nutritional change in types of local grain and 
develops within family groups -- traits that are common to diabetes mellitus but not to inspidus, 
which most commonly appears either at birth or due to brain or kidney injury, so an "outbreak" 
pattern would be highly unusual. However, the form of diabetes described in this India file is 
characterized mainly by excessive urination and "the thirst," symptoms that 
diabetes inspidus shares with mellitus exactly. In fact, the word "diabetes" itself comes from the 
Greek word diabainein for siphon -- a reference to frequent urination -- while the 
designations inspidus, bland, or mellitus, honey-sweet, referred to a practice ancient doctors 
relied on, as tasting the flavor of a patient's urine was the only way to determine which of the 
two types of diabetes had caused their symptoms. 
 
In any case, in this particular instance, diabetes suddenly became a pressing international issue. 
A flurry of letters, observational studies, and drafted articles about the etiology of this mysterious 
diabetes epidemic began to circulate between the British Indies and the Rockefeller Foundation 
offices in New York.[19] The connection between this outbreak and its evident link to particular 
grain sources was pointed out by the observing doctor, but the experts who weighed from afar 
continued resisting this connection. As Dr. Richmond Anderson wrote in a 1952 letter to Dr. J. A 
Kerr, at the Virus Research Centre, "The suggestion that it is primarily a nutritional deficiency 
seems to me a little farfetched." Shortly afterward, Kerr wrote in a subsequent letter to Robert 
Briggs Watson: "Having come to the conclusion that a virus is probably not involved in this 
episode, I feel that I should now withdraw as completely as possible from participation in the 
matter." The pages of this file, which end without resolution or intervention, reveal an 
astonishingly persistent emphasis on contagion within the international health community. The 
same outbreak continued to affect people's lives in India far beyond 1952 -- but without a known 
pathogen to identify, this diabetes epidemic fell outside the network of institutional responsibility 
and slipped quietly off the public health radar. 
 
Observations about such trends in past Rockefeller philanthropic campaigns against worms and 
diabetes can add historical depth to our understandings of how these same programs are 
unfolding today. It is interesting to note that some of the pharmaceutical players that are 
mentioned in the Rockefeller files as suppliers for the early campaigns -- such as Bausch & 
Lomb Optical Company in hookworm interventions, and Merck in insulin research production -- 
have today become the new institutions spearheading these same campaigns. Today Merck's 
international donation of the anti-parasitic drug ivermectin has become a new paradigm of 
corporate philanthropy. Meanwhile Bausch & Lomb, a prominent manufacturer of glucometer 
machines that allow diabetics to test their blood sugar, publishes many of the leading pamphlets 
and informational literature on diabetes care in the United States. The pharmaceutical 
corporations' position has changed from supplier for philanthropic institutions, to today 
themselves becoming leading disseminators of information and treatment. It is provocative to 
consider what fundamental shift in neoliberal structures occurred to make this possible -- to what 
degree are new global health figures like Merck or individuals like Bill Gates following in the 
philanthropic footsteps of the business tycoon John D. Rockefeller, and where do their interests, 
contexts, markets and motivations differ? 
 
Yet this pronounced shift in corporate roles also gives way to an overarching continuity in 
certain ideas of contagion and boundaries ascribed to these two diseases. To this day diabetes is 
primarily treated and addressed on a domestic level by national health institutions, while HIV 
and parasitic diseases remain prominent targets of international health policy and treatment 
campaigns. In past interventions, diabetes was considered a sickness of single individuals, and -- 
as the India files' classification of the diabetes "outbreak" as insipidusrather than mellitus may 
suggest -- perhaps so deeply associated with affluence that when the disease has emerged in 
contexts of scarcity, it is often not recognized or acknowledged. Meanwhile hookworm from the 
beginning has been a symbol of poverty, a disease not of individuals but of groups, struggling 
populations and nations. 
 
The political function of contagion is important to consider in the different trajectories of these 
two diseases. Unlike hookworm, the diabetes narrative cannot be broken down simply into a man 
versus pathogen storyline, where the health institution intervenes like an ally during wartime. 
The diabetes plotline is much more intertangled, since the disease is mainly caused by unhealthy 
food -- usually imported from the very same developed countries sending health aid. Intervention 
for diabetes is not a one-time battle or dose, but a lifelong struggle of daily hedging. This is a 
case where the so-called "war metaphor" does not fit the disease -- a narrative rupture perhaps 
proportionate with the overwhelming lack of funding for diabetes internationally. Every day 
around the world, people die because they do not receive the insulin and other diabetic 
medications they need to survive. Although the "war metaphor" is often criticized in global 
health campaigns, examining the fate of international diabetes care over time forces us to ask 
what actually happens to care when this metaphor breaks down. Is the war metaphor in fact what 
makes fighting a disease internationally possible, or deemed worthy?  
 
Even a brief comparison between diabetes and hookworm as seen through these Rockefeller files 
begins to lay bare ideas of risk and contagion in public health, and the moral underpinnings at 
stake in philanthropic medicine. What meaning lies behind our continuing global focus on 
infectious diseases, when emerging statistics show that the human burden of chronic illness now 
often far outstrips contagious disease in much of the developing world? Why do certain diseases 
elicit sentiments of sympathy or even paternalism, and others attitudes of patient/country 
responsibility? How do mechanisms of pharmaceuticals and narratives of development play a 
role in shaping ideas about which populations we think must be helped, and who is expected to 
save themselves? 
 
 
 
Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author's permission but should not 
be cited or quoted without the author's consent. Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports 
Online is a periodic publication of the Rockefeller Archive Center. Edited by Ken Rose and 
Erwin Levold. Research Reports Online is intended to foster the network of scholarship in the 
history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects covered in the 
collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted by 
researchers who have visited the Archive Center, many of whom have received grants from the 
Archive Center to support their research. The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are 
those of the author and are not intended to represent the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
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